One law for the poor at Grenfell Tower

Steve Tombs, Open University and David Whyte, University of Liverpool

 

In austerity Britain, can justice and accountability be served for the victims of the Grenfell fire? Or are our laws already too much shaped to the needs of the business class?

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Image source: ChiralJon/FlickrCC BY 2.0

 

Days after the Grenfell Tower disaster, London Mayor Sadiq Khan expressed the sentiments of many, not least the bereaved, the survivors and the local community at large, when he stated that, “if negligence or other wrongdoing by individuals or companies played any role whatsoever, I will fight for the full force of the law to be brought to bear.” But what exactly is the full force of the law in this case?

One demand has been that those who had the knowledge and ability to prevent what has happened should be prosecuted for corporate manslaughter. And the fire at Grenfell seems exactly the kind of disaster which the Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act was introduced in 2007 to deal with. Yet in almost 10 years since it was introduced, the law has only been used successfully 21 times – and in no cases has a large organization been convicted following a multi-fatality disaster. In fact, following the deaths of six people at the Lakenal tower block in 2009, the CPS eventually decided against pursuing a case of corporate manslaughter against Southwark council despite the fact that the council “knew the building posed a fire risk but did not act and had not carried out a fire risk assessment.”

In any case, the scope of this relatively new law was carefully shaped to the needs of the business class rather than ordinary people. Champagne and Pimms glasses would no doubt have been chinking in some parts of Kensington and Chelsea when the Blair government announced in 2006 that the new law would grant a blanket exemption to directors and senior individuals in organizations. This means that the most likely result of any such prosecution is a fine against the organization (and in this case the costs of a fine against the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council (RBKC) would ultimately fall on local taxpayers). It is a prime example of what happens so often in our legal system: even the laws that appear to be holding the wealthy to account tend to do nothing of the sort.

Some senior experts have noted that there may be evidence to support a different approach, a prosecution of individuals for the common law offence of manslaughter. We already know unequivocally from the testimonies of the Grenfell Tower Residents Association, that the RBKC was told about the fire risks, and were warned of specific risks on multiple occasions. Yet apparently there was no adequate fire safety assessment.

Here we confront a much deeper problem with the law designed to regulate organizations and businesses. Regulation has been on the back-foot in the UK for some 30 years. Successive governments have virtually mandated a withdrawal from law enforcement in health and safety and in local authority regulation.

When David Cameron pledged to kill off health and safety for good, he followed a long line of governments desperate to prove their pro-business credentials by cutting inspection and prosecution, and stripping back regulations. In most recent years, austerity cuts have taken us to the point that the average workplace can now expect an inspector to call once every 50 years.

Fire protection has been similarly compromised by the cuts. A report by the National Audit Office shows that between 2010 and 2015 funding for stand-alone fire and rescue authorities fell by 28% on average in real terms. Savings came predominantly from reducing staff costs and reducing audits, inspections and fire risk checks. The result: fire safety checks in tower blocks fell 25% in the most recent 5 years. Perhaps most alarmingly in light of Grenfell, the report noted that the government had “reduced funding most to fire and rescue authorities with the highest levels of need….as defined by the social and demographic factors.” In other words, the cuts to fire and rescue services have fallen hardest on the poorest – just like all austerity cuts.

More generally, at local authority level, since the cuts began to bite, campaigns to enforce regulation against business have become almost extinct. This is because most councils, unlike RBKC, have reached rock bottom in terms of their ability to maintain services. As an Environmental Health Officer in Merseyside put it to one of us recently: “it’s going to come to the point where it’s going to affect the residents, the local population, in many ways we are at that point now, public health and protection is being eroded.” Even more galling is that RBKC, the richest borough in London and one of the few councils that remains cash-rich, is choosing law enforcement on behalf of the rich over enforcing the law in the general interest.

We know this by looking closely at what building enforcement officers in Kensington and Chelsea have been doing in recent years. In 2015 RBKC embarked on a major campaign to stop construction companies displaying unlawful and ugly advertisements and messages on the side of the buildings. At the time, RBKC planning policy head Cllr Timothy Coleridge said:

“Unfortunately, some developers ignore the rules and turn their hoardings and scaffolding covers into huge adverts, sometimes in the heart of historic and sensitive residential areas. This is unfair on our residents and it is unfair on those developers that follow the rules and we will prosecute when required.”

In other words, this was a law enforcement campaign aimed at enhancing the aesthetic appeal of the area, and maintaining the successful gentrification of the area, rather than ensuring high standards of building renovation for working class residents.

The public inquiry and inquests will seek to learn how we can prevent another Grenfell Tower happening again. If the police and the CPS are serious about using the full force of the law, it may well be possible to prosecute for corporate manslaughter and for common law manslaughter. Individuals in charge of key decisions can be held accountable for this latter offense if they have acted with gross negligence and have breached a particular duty of care. It is very possible those conditions will be met in the case of Grenfell Tower.

By contrast, a lack of prosecution will send a clear and powerful message: that justice and accountability cannot be served in austerity Britain. But the solution to what happened at Grenfell will not be found in the courts. If there is one resounding lesson that must be learned, it is that any future government must reverse 30 years of attacks on regulation and law enforcement and cease this war against the poor.

This post was first published by Open Democracy on the 21st of June 2017, at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/steve-tombs-and-david-whyte/on-grenfell-one-law-for-rich-one-poor

Undoing Social Protection

Steve Tombs, The Open University

 

It’s going to come to the point where it’s going to affect the residents, the local population, in many ways we are at that point now, public health and protection is being eroded.” Environmental Health Officer, Merseyside

 

Making Regulation Better

 

In 2004, Sir Phillip Hampton was appointed by Chancellor Gordon Brown to oversee a review of 63 major regulatory bodies as well as 468 local authorities. His subsequent report proved to be a watershed in the trajectory of business regulation and enforcement across Britain.  The report formally established a concept of ‘better regulation’ which entailed, notably, a policy shift away from formal law enforcement.

 

The effects of this initiative have been staggering. Between 2003/04 and 2014/15:

 

  • Food hygiene and food standards inspections fell by 15% and 35% respectively, while there were 35% fewer food prosecutions.

 

  • In relation to occupational health and safety, inspections by both the national regulator, the Health and Safety Executive, and local health and safety inspectors, fell by 69%; national prosecutions fell by 35%, whilst local prosecutions fell by 60%.

 

  • Local Environmental Health Officers enforcing pollution control law undertook 55% fewer ‘Part B’ inspection visits and issued 30% fewer enforcement notices.

 

The trends in enforcement are staggering in that they all point in the same direction – enforcement across these three areas is in rapid decline. But if these clearly are effects of ‘Better Regulation’, they are also effects of austerity policies.

 

Better Regulation and the Local State

 

In order to assess what this combination of the politics of better regulation overlain by austerity have meant on the ground, I interviewed 35 local authority front-line inspectors  across 5 local authority areas in Merseyside (Knowsley, Liverpool, Wirral, St Helens, and Sefton) during 2014 and 2015, as a way of examining the state of their enforcement capacities across food, pollution control and occupational health and safety.

 

In the context of business regulation and enforcement, Local Authorities are a particularly appropriate site of analysis – in the three spheres of social protection at issue here, the vast bulk of enforcement occurs at this level. Meanwhile, this is also the place where funding for regulation and enforcement has been reduced the most. Thus, from 2009/2010, local government funding from Westminster came under pressure. Indeed, of all the cuts to Government departments between 2010-2016, the Department for Communities and Local Government has been impacted most of all.  Moreover, analyses of the distribution and impacts of these cuts indicate overwhelmingly that they impact most heavily upon poorer Local Authorities. As one calculation in 2014 put it, “Councils covering the 10 most deprived areas of England – measured  according to the index of multiple deprivation – are losing £782 on average per household, while authorities covering the richest areas are losing just £48 on average. Hart district council in Hampshire, the least deprived local authority, is losing £28 per household, while in Liverpool District B, the most deprived area, the figure is £807”.

 

Perhaps the clearest finding in my interviews across five Local Authorities was that each experienced significant reductions in staffing, notably in the latter part of the period under scrutiny.  In every Local Authority, the numbers of front-line inspectors had fallen significantly between April 2010-April 2015. Overall, total numbers across the three functions fell by over 52% – from 90.65 FTEs to 47.78 FTEs. The declines were across all functions and Authorities, with health and safety inspectors falling most starkly; indeed, in two authorities, Liverpool and Sefton, by 2015 there were no dedicated health and safety inspectors, while at the same date there were no pollution control inspectors in Knowsley.

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Sonae UK’s controversial chipboard plant in Knowsley. Image courtesy of Dave Jacques.

 

Inspectors were in no doubt what these cuts in staffing meant. As one told me, “It’s going to come to the point where it’s going to affect the residents, the local population, in many ways we are at that point now, public health and protection is being eroded”. That view was mirrored almost exactly by another who told me: “We’re at the point where there is no flesh left, this is starting to get dangerous, a danger to public health”.

 

With fewer staff, it is hardly surprising that the inspectors I interviewed raised the issues of a long-term decline in inspection; a long term decline in the use of formal enforcement tools, and a decreasing use of prosecution. Time and time again, inspectors told me of increasing obstacles to the ability to prosecute. These obstacles included: a lack of staff time; fear of losing cases; lack of support from Legal Services departments to prosecute; and an increased political risk (“flak”) in prosecuting. Moreover, these types of responses are indicative of a political context for regulatory enforcement where the idea of regulation is under attack, and are a powerful illustration of how discourses and policies at national level can translate into barriers to enforcement at local levels.

 

While all of the local authorities had seen reductions in staff, this did not just mean a loss of overall resource, but the loss of a particular kind of resource, that is, expertise and experience: redundancies did not only mean that staff were not replaced but a loss of specialist expertise, alongside pressures for regulators to become generalists. As one  inspector put it, “it’s the experienced staff who have gone, so we have lost numbers and expertise”.  In fact, the shift from regulators being specialists to generalists was one consistent theme across the interviews, referred to by numerous respondents and in every authority: “People have had to become generalists”; “most of them are just thankful they’ve still got a job”.

 

The End of Social Protection?

 

Taken together, the trends set out above may mark the beginning of the end of the state’s commitment to, and ability to deliver, social protection. What began as a neo-liberal policy turn to ‘better regulation’ then become turbo-charged under conditions of austerity, where the state claims that it cannot afford to enforce law, and where business must be left to generate recovery. The subsequent institutionalisation of non-enforcement of law sends a green light to business that its routine, systematic, widespread social violence is to be tolerated, allowing private business to externalise the costs of its activities onto workers, consumers, communities, the environment. It further diminishes the quality and longevity of lives of those with the least choice about where they live, what they do for a living or where they buy foodstuffs. And it adds a further dimension to our understanding of the multi-dimensional violence of austerity – even if the story documented in this article is one which attracts little or no political attention.  In short, we are witnessing in the UK the transformation of a system of regulation – a system of social protectionwhich has existed since the 1830s. And, despite its political framing, this is not a story about rules, regulations, nor red tape, nor about the demands of austerity. It is a story about social inequality and avoidable business-generated, state facilitated violence: that is, social murder.

 

Steve Tombs is a contributing author in ‘The Violence of Austerity’ where he writes on Undoing social protection. The book is available to buy from Pluto Press:

http://www.plutobooks.com/promo_thanks.asp?CID=AUSTERITYCOOPER

Better Regulation: better for whom?

Steve Tombs, Professor of Criminology

On 1st May, my new Briefing, ‘Better Regulation’: better for whom?, was published by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies.

Better regulation

This Briefing, drawing on a recent monograph, placed the spotlight on the lack of effective regulation of pollution, food safety and workplace health and safety standards in the UK. An estimated 29,000 deaths each year in the UK are attributable to the effects of airborne pollution. Some one million cases of foodborne illness in the UK each year result in 20,000 hospital admissions and 500 deaths. Around 50,000 people die each year as a result of injuries or health problems originating in the workplace. These staggering figures are probably underestimates. The litany of lives shortened and health impaired to which these figures bear witness are also largely avoidable.

Yet as I documented in Better Regulation, the rate of inspection and enforcement actions for environmental health, food safety and hygiene, and health and safety have all been falling. This is not just a problem of infrequent inspections and lax enforcement. In the name of cutting red tape, governments of all political persuasions have, for over a decade, undermined independent and effective business regulation. Budget cuts under the austerity programme have compounded the problem. So too have moves to outsource and privatise regulatory and enforcement activity. Private companies are increasingly involved in ‘regulating’ themselves.

Taken together, these changes may mark the beginning of the end of the state’s commitment to, and ability to deliver, social protection. The story the Briefing tells is one of ‘avoidable business-generated, state facilitated violence: social murder. And, quite remarkably, it proceeds, daily – met only by academic, political and popular silence’.

The Briefing and its findings have received significant media exposure over the last week, including BBC 5 live Investigates with Adrian Goldberg, BBC News, The Observer, and UNISON. The right-wing, free market think-tank Adam Smith Institute published a rather cheeky critique of it, to which I responded.

Social Protection

Most rewarding of all, however, was coverage by Environmental Health News, the journal of environmental health practitioners, whose struggle to maintain a public service in the face of economic and political attack. I reproduce that interview here, in full…

Q and A with Steve Tombs and Tom Wall

Successive governments have portrayed regulation as a burden. But Professor Steve Tombs, head of social policy and criminology at the Open University, argues the drive to cut red tape has severely reduced the effectiveness of the agencies designed to protect the public. EHN caught up with him after his research was launched last week.

Why did you decide to carry out this research? 

For many years I have been interested in trends in enforcement of health and safety regulation, and it was clear that the shift towards better regulation had, and has, been having an effect on the level of enforcement in that context. So I was keen to understand what had happened in related areas – food and pollution control made sense in that respect. And I wanted to do so at local authority level, where the vast majority of enforcement in these spheres is done, but is something which has rarely been the subject of academic scrutiny.

Did your findings surprise you? 

Absolutely. As a social scientist I am used to gathering data which is messy and needs interpretation. But the quantitative data gleaned from public sources and Freedom of Information requests on enforcement, as well as the qualitative data from interviews with EHOs, is quite remarkable since it all points in the same direction – formal enforcement and enforcement practice is under severe pressure, nationally but especially at local authority level.

Why do you think the vital work of environmental health officers is often invisible to the public? 

Well, as many EHOs said to me, it’s the service that we – by which I mean consumers, communities, workers – only notice when things go wrong, such as an example of an outbreak of food poisoning or a local pollution incident.

What is the better regulation agenda about?  

Better regulation began ostensibly as an initiative to target inspection resources upon the businesses that were either in the highest risk areas, or less compliant, or both, so that regulators could achieve more efficient regulatory outcomes with less inspection – and, of course, less resource. It was a response to claims by business of over regulation and over inspection, and at a local level it was clearly premised on arguments about inconsistency in enforcement practices by different local authorities. To speak in political terms, however, it is clearly a big-business driven agenda designed to protect business from regulatory enforcement. And I heard that from many of the EHOs I interviewed also.

Why have successive governments seemed to embrace this agenda? 

For at least 20 years, the association of regulation and its enforcement with the idea of ‘red tape’, as a ‘burden’ on business, has gained strength. This has been an international trend, I think. In the UK I would say it has been particularly powerful because regulation and red tape have always by many been associated with the interference of the EU. But there are two attractions for any government in this agenda. First, it makes governments appear more business friendly, attracting and retaining business in the country and indeed in local areas. But, second, it offers an opportunity to withdraw resources from regulatory services, as according to this logic these are clearly not needed to the extent that had previously been thought – and governments, especially now in the context of austerity, are always looking for ways to reduce expenditures, especially where they can claim that this makes services more efficient!

What has happened to regulation under David Cameron? 

Cameron is ideologically opposed to these forms of regulation – speech after speech makes that abundantly clear, and I have to say that health and safety regulation and enforcement are a specific target for vitriol here. But more than that, the political initiative towards ‘better regulation’ has, since 2010, been overlain with the economics of austerity. And the latter has seen the DCLG hit harder than any other government Department, and on current spending plans this will continue to be the case until 2020 at least.

Would the Corbyn led Labour party would take a different approach? 

Well I would hope so. But let’s remember that the better regulation initiative started under a Labour government. Of course, that government was elected after 18 years in opposition and was dying to prove its business friendly credentials. A Corbyn led Labour Party looks and feels quite different, and I would hope it will take a more balanced approach to regulation. Certainly I have shared platforms with John McDonnell in the past where I have been documenting tends in health and safety enforcement and he has been clear that these trends need to be reversed; I would also hope, and expect, that this new party leadership would agree and act on this. I would hope a Corbyn led Labour party would take the same view of the work of regulators in general.  In particular, I am optimistic that they will see the work of EHOs for what it is – providing a crucial public service which benefits all of us, that is consumers, workers, local communities and in fact, I would argue, businesses themselves. I really think it is crucial to resuscitate the idea of public service, and oppose the idea that regulation is just red tape designed to somehow make all of our lives more difficult. I would hope a Corbyn led party would share that view.

What can EHOs who are concerned about this agenda do? 

That’s a very difficult question to answer, the EHOs I have met get on day-to-day doing their best with less and less and, as one put it to me, their ‘light is hidden under a bushel’. I think it is for others to try and challenge the agenda – EHN regularly documents the deterioration of the service, and I think the CIEH needs to be less defensive and be more vocal in representing the value of the work of its members. UNISON has done work in this area, but I think this should be a more central issue for them – it’s key to the public health agenda. And I think that some intervention by academics – who have some time, and resources – might also be useful.

The Adam Smith Institute claims the research is flawed because it doesn’t show a historical link between falling numbers of EHOs and rising preventable deaths. How would you respond? 

It’s rather odd to be criticised for not doing something in a briefing which I never set out to do therein – demonstrably linking a decline in enforcement capacity to an increase in risk – I’ll restrict myself to a few brief comments.

Increased deaths, injuries and illnesses are difficult to gauge because we know that most of the data in any of these areas is simply not robust enough to track trends over relatively short time scales.

How many of us who suffer some form of food poisoning which we link to something we’ve eaten or bought from a fast food outlet or supermarket business actually report that to the local authority? A very small percentage I think it’s fair to say.

Moreover, which of us knows that we are being subject to airborne pollutants that will shorten our lives as we go about our daily business – or, even if we did, could link a specific pollutant to its specific profit-generating source?

We also know that the majority of workplace injuries and work-related ill-health never get reported. So the state of data in this area makes it very difficult to undertake ‘the X causes Y’ type logic that would satisfy the intellectuals at the Adam Smith Institute.

Of course, what we can do is point to specific cases of death, injury or illness associated with an obvious form of non-compliance with law that would have been picked up by an inspection had there been one.

Radio Five Live, which today broadcast on issues covered by the Briefing, interviewed Debbie, a woman in Kirby whose 10-year-old daughter was hospitalised with salmonella poisoning. She was one of over 50 people in the area who contracted the illness after eating food from a takeaway. Contrary to Food Standards Agency statutory guidance, the business had not been formally inspected in 2 years.

Finally, the equation of lesser enforcement with greater risk seems likely even on a common-sense level. Consider this: the average workplace regulated by a local authority health and safety inspector is now statistically likely to receive a visit from an inspector once every 20 years. I would imagine all of us, however civic minded and potentially law abiding, would be less likely to buy a train or tube ticket if we knew we would only be checked that we had it once every 20 years.

 

The Q&A with Tom Wall was originally published in Environmental Health News, the online journal of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health on 4 May 2016, at http://www.ehn-online.com/news/article.aspx?id=15514. Steve Tombs would like to thank colleagues at the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, HERC, engage@liverpool and UNISON for their support in this project.

 

Banking Crimes without End

Steve Tombs

The Open University

In the last week of February 2016, two reports were published by the National Audit Office, on the same day. One calculated that ‘Claims management firms take quarter of PPI payouts’, the other warning that ‘Pensions overhaul could trigger raft of mis-selling’. Each was a telling reminder that the financial services sector is criminogenic, a series of markets and firms where crime is part of normal business practice and within which UK banks are “serial offenders”.

In recent years, the financial sector has been the site of an endless litany of ‘big crimes’. These include the fixing of the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate, an inter-bank lending rate), and the price of both gold and silver, to the mis-selling of loans to small businesses, as well as ‘organised and aggressive tax avoidance, tax fraud, money laundering, corruption and feeding misleading stock market research to investors to drum up business and higher fees – just to men­tion a few of their misdeeds’.

If apparently esoteric, and not widely understood, none of these are victimless crimes. For example, the effect of manipulat­ing the LIBOR was to increase the cost of personal, busi­ness and state borrowing across the board – thus placing a premium on everything from personal loans and mort­gages to the costs of building hospitals through the PFI. LIBOR is used to set the value of financial transactions worth an estimated $300 trillion. Fixing its rate affects individuals and families, employees and employers, lenders and borrowers, and central and local Government – that is, everyone.

None of which is yet to mention the biggest crimes of all, emerging during 2007 and culminating in the financial crisis. In the UK, the response to a crisis precipitated by long term and systematic fraud and theft was a rescue of private capital from the public purse, via a series of bailouts – the first tranche of which had amounted to the tune of £850bn before the end of 2009. The financial commitments made by Governments since September 2008 have included purchasing shares in banks to enable re-capitalization, indemnifying the Bank of England against losses incurred in providing liquidity support, underwriting borrowing by banks to strengthen liquidity, and providing insurance cover for assets. The Government “cash outlay” is said to have peaked “at £133 billion, equivalent to more than £2,000 for every person in the UK”. In stark contrast, the costs of the public purse rescuing private capital have been politically re-framed and the UK population has been schooled in the dogma of austerity, the crash having been an effect of public lassitude. So as the public sector is dismantled, capital is set ever-freer – since, with no little irony, it is only private capital which can now rescue the national economy. Regulation is to be avoided. And there have been virtually no regulatory reform nor criminal justice responses to the crisis in the UK of any significance.

the corporate criminal

Cover image from The Corporate Criminal

But away from headline-grabbing events are a series of systematic, mass crimes in which millions are victimised by the all of the major financial services companies. Particularly since the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the Financial Services Act (1986), consumers of financial services firms have been victims of three major waves of offences in the UK. These have involved many of the same (well-known) financial services companies.

First, the gradual withdrawal of the Conservative Government from pension provision, coupled with deregulation of the retail financial services sector in the UK in the latter half of the 1980s, created the conditions for a wave of pensions mis-selling. Companies launched into a hard sell, wrongly advising many clients to cash in existing pensions contributions and transfer them to a new, private scheme about which they received false information. Although breaches had been first uncovered in 1990, a KPMG survey of pensions advice given during 1991-1993 revealed that in “four out of five cases” pensions companies were still giving advice which fell short of the legally required minima. Early in 1998, the-then new regulatory body, the Financial Services Authority, estimated the final costs as around £11billion, almost three times the original estimate, with some 2.4 million victims.

At the end of the 1990s, evidence of widespread mis-selling of endowment mortgages also begun to emerge. Following the end of state house-building and Government encouragement of home ‘ownership’, millions of such policies had been sold through the 1980s and 1990s based on the claim that on maturity of the endowment policy, the sum returned to an investor would pay off the costs of their homes, a claim which often proved to be false. About five million people were victimised. The saga of mortgage fraud is uncannily similar to that of pensions mis-selling. First, the list of companies involved in each is virtually identical. Second, the endowment mortgage scandal was characterised by long term obduracy on the part of companies in the sector initially to admit any wrongdoing, then subsequently to compensate victims.

A virtually identical sequencing of events then unfolded with respect to Personal Payment Protection Insurance (PPPI). PPPI policies were widely marketed and sold at the start of this century, at the height of the credit boom. Financial services firms targeted customers with debts such as mortgages, credit cards or loans insurance against a future inability to meet repayments. But again, these products were often sold when they were unnecessary, or without customers’ knowledge, or indeed were to prove invalid in the event of customers claiming against them. In 2005, the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) filed a “super-complaint” relating to PPPI mis-selling to the Office of Fair Trading.  Yet this did not stop companies continuing to engage in a business they knew to be illegal: some 16 million PPPI policies have been sold since 2005. Moreover, the companies embroiled in the mis-selling of PPPI  included many of the, by now, ‘usual suspects’: the Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, HSBC, Santander, MBNA, NRAM (Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley), Yorkshire and Clydesdale banks, the Co-op bank, Nationwide, Capital One, Welcome Financial, Principality Building Society – and Tesco.

These will not be the last ‘scandals’ associated with the retail financial services sector and its direct targeting of individual consumers. The latest candidate, almost to take us back to the 1990s, is a further round of pensions mis-selling, predicted by many when Osborne further deregulated the market in April 2015 by allowing the cashing in of pensions, with the National Audit Office warning of widespread exploitation in February this year.

All of these involve more or less the same companies. They affect millions of people in ways that are diffuse. They generate a series of forms of victimisation and social harms.  And such crimes and harms look set to continue to proliferate as the state, certainly in the UK, creates its own condition of impotence, further empowering private capital, not least pre-eminent finance capital, to construct its own rules of engagement.